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Higgins: Let Legislators Legislate

LET LEGISLATORS LEGISLATE: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER
ALLOWING MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TO FILE
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS TO AVOID LITIGATION
Matthew Higgins*

“If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government
would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered
by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself.”
- James Madison, President of the United States1
I. INTRODUCTION
When an individual is elected to office, voters expect him or her to
behave ethically. Furthermore, voters expect their representative to be
held accountable if they behave unethically or break the law. American
voters have historically held their representatives to a high standard and
held firm in the notion that no one is above the law in our system of
democracy.2 The United States government is also based on the notion
that avoiding tyranny is best accomplished through a decentralized
government.3
One way to ensure a decentralized government and avoid the
centralization of power is to ensure that each branch of government is
armed with self-defense against the other branches.4 The founders granted
each branch of government exclusive powers through the various articles
of the Constitution.5 A nightmare scenario of the framers was that one
branch could intimidate the other through the use of the judiciary.6 For
instance, if the Executive could intimidate legislators into following its
agenda by indicting individual legislators and burdening them with
* Associate Member, 2018-19, University of Cincinnati Law Review
1. James Madison, The Federalist Papers no. 51 (1788).
2. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 (1974).
3. “[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means
and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in
all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack.” Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 698 (1988) (quoting Federalist No. 51, pp. 321–322).
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I; id. art. II; id. art. III.
6. Works of Thomas Jefferson, 322–23 (1797).
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litigation, the founders believed that this would cause a disturbance in the
balance of the government.
To avoid this nightmare, the Speech or Debate clause was included in
the Constitution.7 The separation of powers doctrine was also implicit in
the structure of the Constitution and explicitly included in provisions such
as the Rulemaking Clause.8 When legislators have been indicted, Courts
have traditionally allowed these provisions to permit a Member of
Congress to file an interlocutory appeal.9
An interlocutory appeal is an appeal of a ruling by a trial court that is
made before the trial itself has commenced or concluded. Interlocutory
appeals are generally disfavored because they can lead to piecemeal
litigation and judicial inefficiency.10 As an exception, due to weighty
policy concerns, infra, federal appellate courts have allowed Members of
Congress to file pre-trial interlocutory appeals based on either a Speech
or Debate Clause argument or a separation of powers doctrine argument.11
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit recently disallowed a Member of
Congress to rely on a separation of powers argument and denied
jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal, creating a circuit split.12 This is
problematic because it limits a Member of Congress’s ability to avoid the
burdens of litigation. If a Member of Congress is improperly burdened
with litigation, he or she is unable to adequately represent his or her
constituents.
This Article will discuss the practical effects of each side of the Circuit
split’s approaches and conclude that Second, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits’ approach should be adopted by all Circuit Courts. This Article
proceeds as follows: first, Section II of this note will provide a general
background of the Speech and Debate Clause and the separation of
powers doctrine. Then, Section III will discuss the circuit split in detail
which currently consists of the Second, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits agreeing that Members of Congress can seek interlocutory appeal
based on both a Speech and Debate Clause argument and a separation of
powers argument, whereas the Seventh Circuit only allows an
interlocutory appeal based on the explicit “immunity” created by the

7. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 6, cl. 1.
8. Only the House can interpret its rules and punish its Members under them. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 5, cl. 2.
9. An indictment in this context will likely arise out of alleged unethical or criminal behavior
surrounding the duties of Congressmen—charges such as bribery or tax evasion. See generally United
States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 935–36 (2d Cir. 1980).
10. See 28 U.S. Code § 1292.
11. See United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 935–36 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Helstoski v. Meanor,
442 U.S. 500 (1979)).
12. United States v. Schock, 891 F.3d 334 (7th Cir. 2018).
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Speech or Debate clause.13 After discussing the circuit split, Section IV
will provide a more detailed argument of the Seventh Circuit’s approach
and concludes that the Seventh Circuit’s approach is incorrect because it
does not consider key policy concerns mentioned by other Circuits,
improperly creates a structural versus individual separation of powers
doctrine, tarnishes a representative democracy, and lacks judicial
restraint.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. The Speech or Debate Clause14
The inclusion of the Speech or Debate Clause in the American
Constitution was influenced by the English legal tradition, or Common
Law.15 The Clause states: “[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House,
[Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other
Place.”16 The Speech or Debate Clause is a privilege which, in theory,
allows elected representatives to best focus on their representative duties
by freeing them from coercion by the Judiciary or Executive branches of
government.17 Its key purpose is to “prevent intimidation by the executive
and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary.”18
Although the Speech or Debate Clause was born from English
tradition, the child is not identical to its parent. In the English system of
government, Parliament is the supreme authority, rather than a co-equal
branch of government.19 While the English speech or debate privilege
preserves legislative supremacy, the American privilege merely ensures
the legislative branch remains independent from its coordinate branches.20
Therefore, the Supreme Court of the United States has restricted the
Speech or Debate Clause privilege to only “legislative acts.”21
Specifically, the privilege applies only to actions related to voting and

13. See United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 185–86 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Claiborne,
727 F.2d 842, 844–45 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 708–09 (11th Cir. 1982);
Myers, 635 F.2d at 935–36 (2d Cir. 1980).
14. This section was largely guided by Rose, 28 F.3d at 181.
15. See Rose, 28 F.3d at 187. The English speech or debate privilege is enshrined in the English
Bill of Rights. It arose out of a “history of conflict between the House of Commons and the Tudor and
Stuart Monarchs during which successive monarchs utilized the criminal and civil law to suppress and
intimidate critical legislators.” United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
17. Works of Thomas Jefferson, 322–23 (1797).
18. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 181.
19. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972).
20. Id.
21. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972).
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various committee activities.22 Surprisingly, the Court has held that many
activities that are commonly on a representative’s schedule, such as
communicating with government agencies, assisting in securing
government contracts, or delivering speeches outside of Congress are not
protected under the Speech or Debate privilege.23
As discussed below, Members of Congress facing charges in a federal
district court commonly rely on the Speech or Debate Clause to argue
immunity from litigation.24 The common argument presented is that the
Judiciary does not have the authority to question the actions done in the
legislative branch. Of course, to win on this argument the Member of
Congress must persuade the court that his or her actions in question were
“legislative acts” and thus qualify for the privilege.
B. Separation of Powers Doctrine
After defeating King George III, The Framers of the Constitution
believed decentralization of government through separation of powers to
be of the utmost importance to the success of the newly formed
Republic.25 The Separation of Powers doctrine is also referred to as a
system of “Checks and Balances.” Different articles of the Constitution
grant different powers to each branch of government.26 Article I of the
Constitution grants specific powers to Congress which the other branches
are not granted.27 Specifically, it grants each House of Congress the power
to regulate its own members: “Each House may determine the Rules of
its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with
the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”28
Members of Congress commonly argue that another branch of
government cannot bring a claim against, or oversee a case against, a
member of the legislative branch because such claims encroach on the
separation of powers doctrine. Because the Constitution granted Congress
22. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 313 (1973) (Committee activities such as: “authorizing an
investigation, holding hearings, preparing a report, and authorizing the publication and distribution of that
report”).
23. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512.
24. See supra note 9.
25. James Madison, The Federalist Papers no. 47 (1788). (“The accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny"). Also,
post-Revolutionary War Americans increasingly viewed the separation of powers as "the most important
attribute of the kinds of governments they had fought for." Entin, Jonathan L., "Separation of Powers, the
Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial Review" (1990). Faculty Publications. Paper 367 (quoting
G. Wood, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 453 (1969).
26. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I; id. art. II; id. art. III..
27. U.S. CONST. art. I.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
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the power to self-regulate its Members, Members of Congress argue that
another branch cannot litigate the internal affairs of Congress. 29
III. AN OVERVIEW
There is a long history of jurisprudence allowing for Members of
Congress to file for interlocutory appeal based on arguments claiming
immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause or the separation of powers
doctrine.30 The general consensus among the federal circuits was that the
policy reasons for normally disallowing interlocutory appeals—mainly
judicial efficiency—were outweighed by the policy considerations of
Members of Congress facing litigation.31 The policy concern for
legislators is that they cannot properly represent their constituents if they
are burdened with litigation. Therefore, the interlocutory appeal situation
most commonly arose when a pretrial motion to dismiss a claim based on
either the Speech or Debate Clause or a separations of powers argument
had been denied by the district court. The denial of the aforementioned
claim is not a “final order,” but many Circuit Courts grant interlocutory
appeal because allowing litigation in the district court to begin would
defeat valid policy concerns raised by the Members of Congress and
accepted by most federal circuit courts.32
Presently, all Circuits are in agreement that the Speech or Debate
Clause is a valid argument under which to seek interlocutory appeal.33
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit recently held that while the Speech or
Debate Clause argument was valid, the separation of powers doctrine was
not a valid argument to seek interlocutory appeal.34 This decision created
a Circuit Split between the Seventh Circuit, and the Second, Ninth,
Eleventh and D.C. Circuits which allow a Member of Congress to raise a
separation of powers argument in order to seek interlocutory appeal.
A. Courts in Favor of Allowing Congressional Interlocutory Appeals
Based on the Separation of Powers Doctrine
The Second, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits are in agreement that
individuals can seek interlocutory appeal based on a separation of powers
argument.35 However, only the Second and D.C. Circuit have dealt with
29. See cases cited supra note 13.
30. See cases cited supra note 13.
31. See cases cited supra note 13.
32. United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 935–36 (2d Cir. 1980).
33. This is because there is Supreme Court precedent on the matter in Helstoski v. Meanor, 442
U.S. 500, 506–08 (1979).
34. United States. v. Schock, 891 F.3d 334 (7th Cir. 2018).
35. See cases cited supra note 13.
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the issue in respect to a Member of Congress raising the separation of
powers argument.36
In United States v. Myers, Congressman Michael O. Myers of
Pennsylvania sought an interlocutory appeal from the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals after a federal district court denied his motion to dismiss
an Ethics in Government Act action brought against him by the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”).37 Because the action against him was
brought by the DOJ, an entity of the Executive Branch, he claimed
immunity based on the separation of powers doctrine and the Speech or
Debate Clause.38 The Court of Appeals relied on Supreme Court
precedent in Helstoski to determine that the Member of Congress was
entitled to a pretrial appeal under the Speech or Debate Clause.39
For the same reasoning that the Second Circuit Court allowed the
Speech or Debate Clause to be the basis for the interlocutory appeal, it
allowed review of the dismissal on the grounds of separation of powers.40
The Court noted that the separation of powers argument does not provide
as precise of a protection as the Speech or Debate Clause, but the
underlying policies of the separation of powers doctrine require that a
Member of Congress be shielded from standing trial before another
branch of government.41 The Court reasoned that the two arguments were
in the same spirit of protecting the independence of the Legislative Branch
and ensuring that constituents were fully represented by their
Representatives and Senators.42
The Myers Court went on to weigh the policy concerns of allowing a
Member of Congress to avoid litigation versus the interest of judicial
efficiency that traditionally precludes piecemeal litigation.43 The Court
found that the following concerns of the Members of Congress outweigh
the concern of judicial efficiency: (1) The strain, expense, and injury to
reputation resulting from a trial, even if the Member of Congress prevails
at trial, will have adverse consequences to a representative democracy;
and (2) the opportunity for intimidation by the Executive Branch is
reduced by the knowledge that prosecutions encountering valid legal
defenses will be promptly terminated by an interlocutory appeal before
the trial even commences.44 The Court opined that “little would be lost in
36. Claiborne and Hastings dealt with federal judges, not Members of Congress.
37. Myers, 635 F.2d at 934.
38. Id. at 935.
39. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 32.
40. Myers, 635 F.2d at 934 (“[T]he Speech or Debate Clause, when applicable, provides the kind
of protection that should be vindicated by preventing a trial, rather than setting aside its outcome”).
41. Id.
42. Myers, 635 F.2d at 936.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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the way of judicial efficiency if pre-trial appeals by indicted Members of
Congress were to include all legal defenses.”45
Twenty-four years after the Myers decision, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals found the reasoning in Myers to be “particularly instructive” to
its decision in United States v. Rose.46 Like in Myers, the DOJ brought an
action against a Congressman, Charles G. Rose III. After the district court
judge denied the Congressman’s motion to dismiss, Rose filed for
interlocutory appeal based on the separation of powers doctrine and the
Speech or Debate Clause.47 Rose’s case was very similar to Myers, but it
did have one key difference: Myers was a criminal case, while Rose was
a civil case.48 The Rose Court concluded that the difference was
immaterial because the immunity protects legislators from any type of
litigation.49
The Rose Court held that it had appellate jurisdiction over both the
separation of powers claim, and the Speech or Debate Clause claim.50
Relying on Myers, the Court reasoned that “like the Speech or Debate
Clause immunity, separation of powers immunity should protect
legislators from the burden of litigation and diversion from congressional
duties, whether the litigation be civil or criminal.”51
Although both Courts of Appeals determined that they had appellate
jurisdiction over both the separation of powers and Speech or Debate
Clause claim, each affirmed the decision of the district court. Therefore,
both Congressmen still faced “the burdens of litigation” after the grant of
interlocutory appeal.52
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Decision in United States v. Schock
Aaron Schock was a United States Representative for the Eighteenth
District of Illinois.53 In March 2015, he resigned from Congress after his

45. Id.
46. United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
47. Id. at 182-183.
48. Id. at 186.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 185.
51. Id. at 186.
52. Id. at 190; Myers, 635 F.2d at 942. This is an important fact that will be covered more in Part
IV. In sum, the separation of powers doctrine gives Congressman a tool to use to potentially avoid
litigation and enjoy its immunity. The reality, however, is that, in most cases, the court grants the
interlocutory appeal but still affirms the district court’s dismissal of the claim for immunity from litigation.
See infra Part IV.
53. Elvia Malagon, Ex-Rep. Aaron Schock's Trial on Federal Corruption Charges Moved to June,
Chicago Tribune, October 5, 2018, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-aaronschock-court-hearing-20181003-story.html. (last visited on November 15, 2018).
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constituents took issue with trips he took at the public’s expense.54
Twenty months after his resignation, he was charged in a federal
indictment for mail and wire fraud, theft of government funds, making
false statements to Congress and the Federal Elections Commission, and
filing false tax returns.55 After being indicted, Shock moved to dismiss
the indictment on claims that the charge was inconsistent with the Speech
or Debate Clause and the separation of powers doctrine.56 The district
court denied his motion to dismiss and he appealed to the Seventh
Circuit.57
First, the Seventh Circuit held that interlocutory appeals are permitted
under the Speech or Debate Clause, but the immunity granted under the
Speech or Debate Clause did not apply to Schock because his actions were
not “legislative acts.”58 Then, the Court moved to the principle argument:
the rules about reimbursable expenses were adopted under Art. 1, §5, cl.
2 of the Constitution, and only the House can interpret its rules and punish
its Members under them.59 The Seventh Circuit explained its reasoning
for not being persuaded by the decisions of other circuits as follows:
Neither the separation of powers generally, nor the Rulemaking Clause in
particular, establishes a personal immunity from prosecution or trial. The
separation of powers is about the allocation of authority among the
branches of the federal government. It is an institutional doctrine rather
than a personal one. The Speech or Debate Clause, by contrast, sets up a
personal immunity for each legislator. The Supreme Court limits
interlocutory appeals to litigants who have a personal immunity—a “right
not to be tried.” No personal immunity, no interlocutory appeal.60

The Court based its holding on the difference between “institutional”
and “personal” rights.61 Essentially, the Court held that the Speech or
Debate Clause created a specific personal immunity from litigation, but
the separation of powers doctrine did not. Instead, the separation of
powers doctrine merely applied to the branches of government as
institutions, not the individuals within them. Finally, the Court affirmed

54. United States v. Schock, 891 F.3d 334, 335-336 (7th Cir. 2018). Some of the alleged expenses
were using money from his campaign accounts and his House allowance for personal expenses ranging
from an extravagant remodeling of his home office inspired by the British television show “Downton
Abbey” to flying on a private plane to a Chicago Bears game. Elvia Malagon, Ex-Rep. Aaron Schock's
Trial on Federal Corruption Charges Moved to June, Chicago Tribune, October 5, 2018 (last visited on
November 15, 2018).
55. Schock, 891 F.3d at 336.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 336.
60. Id. at 337.
61. Id. at 338.
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the district court’s decision with respect to the Speech or Debate Clause
and dismissed the appeal based on a separation of powers argument.62
It is important to note that the holding of the Schock case applies to
interlocutory appeals in criminal cases based on institutional arguments
about the separation of powers.63 However, the reasoning in Rose is still
compelling because differences between criminal or civil causes of action
are immaterial to the underlying policy concerns of protecting legislators
from the burdens of litigation, criminal or civil.64
IV. DISCUSSION
This section will discuss why the Second, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits are correct in allowing Members of Congress to file interlocutory
appeals based on a separation of powers argument. The balancing test
given in Myers is the correct framework for analyzing the issue regarding
whether the policy concerns permitting Members of Congress to avoid
the burdens of litigation outweigh the need for judicial efficiency.65 The
answer to this issue is clearly “yes,” because the judicial system should
not place efficiency above more weighty concerns like the Members’
duties to their constituents.66
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit’s institutional separation of powers
logic is inherently flawed. A clear understanding of the history behind the
Speech or Debate Clause and separation of powers doctrine shows the
similarity in the underlying concerns which birthed their creation and
inclusion in the Constitution. The Rulemaking clause, analyzed as part of
the separations of powers doctrine, is proof enough that the separation of
powers doctrine does not only apply to each branch of government as an
institution, but to the individuals within the institution as well. To say
otherwise is non-functional and contrary to any sensible understanding of
history.
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit mistakenly reasoned that allowing a
Member of Congress to file for interlocutory appeal under a separation of
powers doctrine would create Congressional immunity from litigation.67
An interlocutory appeal for a motion to dismiss does not create immunity,
it creates the opportunity for immunity. This is a key distinction because
a proper understanding of it negates the argument that allowing the
interlocutory appeal would permit Members of Congress to be above the
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 340.
Id. at 339.
Rose, 28 F.3d at 186.
United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 936 (2d Cir. 1980).
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
Schock, 891 F.3d at 337.
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law. In the two principle cases already described, Myers and Rose, the
district courts’ decisions were affirmed, and the Members of Congress
still faced litigation after the interlocutory appeal was heard.68 Allowing
an exception to the general rule against interlocutory appeals in this
context merely gives the opportunity for immunity if the Member of
Congress can persuade the court of his or her argument.
A possible explanation for the Seventh Circuit’s split with the other
circuits are the facts underlying the charges against Congressman Schock.
His alleged misuse of funds was highly publicized because he was
deemed a “rising star” in the Republican party and the expenses were
outrageous, ranging from personal tickets to the Chicago Bears to
remodeling his home office in a style inspired by “Downtown Abbey.”69
Because of these outrageous facts, the Seventh Circuit may not have
wanted to allow any additional avenue for the Congressman to escape
litigation. By closing the door to the Speech or Debate Clause claim, the
court sent the message that no individual is above the law, even Members
of Congress. While that motivation may be compelling, especially in
Shock’s case, it is unnecessary. Allowing an interlocutory appeal based
on the Speech or Debate Clause does not automatically create immunity.
It is simply a carve-out to the general rule against interlocutory appeals.
A court still has discretion to dismiss the interlocutory appeal and affirm
the district court’s decision, sending a Congressman’s case to litigation.
If a possible immunity does not apply, then it does not apply. That does
not, however, negate the fact that the immunity still exists for other cases
and circumstances. Although the Seventh Circuit may have had
compelling reasons for its decision, it was an unnecessary and incorrect
decision to make.
Using Myers as a framework, courts should liberally construe the
separation of powers doctrine and the Speech or Debate Clause to allow
Members of Congress facing litigation more, not less, tools to avoid the
burdens of litigation.
A. The Policy Concerns Allowing Members of Congress to File an
Interlocutory Appeal Outweigh the Concern for Judicial Efficiency—
Why the Second, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits are Right.
The primary reason for not allowing interlocutory appeals as a general
rule is to avoid piecemeal litigation in the interest of judicial efficiency.70
However, the Supreme Court has stated that “[c]onvenience and
efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of
68. Myers, 635 F.2d at 942; United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
69. Malagon, supra note 52.
70. Myers, 635 F.2d at 956.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss1/7

10

Higgins: Let Legislators Legislate

2019]

LET LEGISLATORS LEGISLATE

283

democratic government.”71 Moreover, the rule against interlocutory
appeals has other exceptions. For instance, interlocutory decisions, while
not final, are appealable if they have a final and irreparable effect on the
rights of the parties.72 While there are exceptions to the general rule
against interlocutory appeals, each is narrowly applied.73
The Myers and Rose courts correctly applied a narrow exception to the
general rule that stemmed from the Speech or Debate Clause and the
separation of powers doctrine. While it is understandable that allowing
piecemeal litigation would burden the courts, the reason to allow it in this
context outweighs the burden. If a court did not allow a Member of
Congress to seek interlocutory appeal, irreparable harm would be done to
the Member of Congress’s political capital and reputation which in turn
hurts his or her ability to represent constituents.74
Imagine the following scenario: A Congresswoman is in her second
term of office. She has spent years fighting diligently against a pipeline
which she believes would ruin the natural beauty of the state she
represents. In fact, she ran her campaign heavily on this specific issue and
was elected in a landslide. After years of work and political maneuvering,
she is finally able to bring a bill to the floor to oppose the construction of
the pipeline. Months before the bill is on the floor, the hypothetical
Congresswoman is indicted for allegedly misusing federal funds. She files
a motion to dismiss based on the Speech or Debate Clause or the
separation of powers doctrine. The district court denies her motion. She
likely has a stronger argument based on the separation of powers doctrine;
however, if the case was in the Seventh Circuit she would be unable to
file for interlocutory appeal based on this argument. As a consequence,
she is burdened with litigation. Now, instead of whipping votes for her
bill, she is preparing for trial.
The consequence of the above hypothetical is clear: an elected official
can no longer represent her constituents because of the burdens of
litigation. The most frightening result is if she ends up with a favorable
outcome at trial because, now, it was a waste of time and a distraction that
affected her ability to represent her constituents.
On the other hand, had the Seventh Circuit aligned with the other
circuit courts and permitted the appeal to be based on a separation of
powers argument, there is a strong chance that she may prevail on appeal
and get back to Congress without much wasted time. An appellate court
should accept this argument because it addresses the same policy
concerns of the Speech or Debate Clause and gives a Congresswoman
71.
72.
73.
74.

Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944.
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949) (collateral order doctrine).
Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009).
Myers, 635 F.2d at 936.
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additional tools to avoid unnecessary and distracting litigation. If a court
is not persuaded by the argument, it can affirm the district court’s
decision. If a court is persuaded, however, the Congresswoman is now
able to continue her work in the House. She will likely still face an internal
investigation and hearing, but it will be much less burdensome than a trial.
Therefore, if she is guilty or liable, she is still held accountable for her
actions through a House ethics investigation.
There are other policy concerns outside of the above hypothetical
which are also compelling for permitting the separation of powers
doctrine to be the basis of an interlocutory appeal in this situation:
deterring the executive from using the courts to intimidate Members of
Congress if it is known that they can terminate the action before trial,
harming constituents, and diminishing the public’s trust in a
representative form of government.75
For all of the above reasons, the policy concerns of allowing an
interlocutory appeal under a separation of powers argument greatly
outweigh judicial efficiency. The Seventh Circuit should not have shut
the door on the opportunity to uphold these policy concerns. By
disallowing an interlocutory appeal based on the separation of powers
doctrine, the Seventh Circuit is greatly harming the representative
democratic system of our government. The judiciary should show
restraint and tread lightly when potentially exercising power over another
branch of government.76
B. The Separation of Powers Doctrine is More Than a Schoolhouse
Rock! Song
The institutional versus personal separation of powers argument the
Seventh Circuit utilized is not based in law or reality. As a reminder, the
Seventh Circuit used the following reasoning for its holding in Schock:
The separation of powers is about the allocation of authority among the
branches of the federal government. It is an institutional doctrine rather
than a personal one. The Speech or Debate Clause, by contrast, sets up a
personal immunity for each legislator.77

The court almost entirely relies on this distinction to reach its conclusion
that an interlocutory appeal is not proper under the separation of powers
doctrine.

75. Id.
76. Daniel N. Reisman, “Deconstructing Justice Scalia’s Separation of Powers Jurisprudence: The
Preeminent Executive, 53 Alb. L. Rev. 49 (1988-1989).
77. United States v. Schock, 891 F.3d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 2018).
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This distinction seems to be created by the Seventh Circuit judges. In
an attempt to prove its reasoning, the Shock court lists the other
interlocutory appeal cases, discussed above, and points out how none of
them address the institutional separation of powers logic.78 The reason for
the omission is that the distinction is a matter of legal fiction created by
the Seventh Circuit.
The Framers established a system designed to prevent overreaching by
one branch at the expense of another.79 To ensure a functional
government, the Constitution provides officials of each branch with the
“necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments of the others.”80 Therefore, the separation of powers
doctrine is not merely an institutional blueprint, but a living and breathing
doctrine that serves to protect against tyranny. To be effective, members
of each branch must adhere to only the powers allotted to their respective
branch of government.81 Of course, the Constitution does not contemplate
total separation of the branches of government;82 therefore, the separation
of powers doctrine protects against tyranny while simultaneously
permitting sufficient interaction between the branches.83
The Seventh Circuit failed to realize that the separation of powers
doctrine is a functionalist doctrine. To state that it is merely about the
allocation of authority among the branches of the federal government is
grossly inaccurate. Although the separation of powers doctrine does in
fact allocate authority among the branches, that is not the end of its
function and intention. The doctrine is not merely a Schoolhouse Rock!
description of the federal government; it is a doctrine that is present
whenever the branches of government are interacting with each other.84
Moreover, branches of government are not only the institutions
described in the Constitution, but also the officers within them. Therefore,
it is entirely proper for a Member of Congress to raise a separation of
powers argument in the judiciary when seeking interlocutory appeal. For
the separation of powers doctrine to be effective, it must be invoked
aggressively by officials to safeguard the powers enumerated to their

78. Id.
79. Entin, Jonathan L., "Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial
Review" (1990). Faculty Publications. Paper 367.
80. Entin, Jonathan L., "Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial
Review" (1990). Faculty Publications. Paper 367 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51).
81. Entin, Jonathan L., "Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial
Review" (1990). Faculty Publications. Paper 367.
82. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976).
83. Id.
84. Schoolhouse Rock! was a popular educational television series which taught various topics to
children, including American history and government, through song. One of the most popular songs
described how a bill becomes law: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H-eYBZFEzf8.
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respective branches. The Seventh Circuit’s decision to disallow such an
argument is in direct conflict with the intention of the Framers.85 While
“immunity” may not be the correct term to use, the separation of powers
doctrine does create a level of sovereignty from other branches. To say
that applies only to the institution of Congress fails to realize that the
institution is run by the officials within it. In certain circumstances, the
actions of Members of Congress are immune from the powers of the
judiciary based on the separation of powers doctrine.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning is correct,
the policy concerns described in Myers should still direct a court to allow
a separation of powers argument in this context. The court should be
liberal, not restrictive, in allowing Members of Congress the opportunity
to avoid litigation when appropriate. A court with judicial restraint
understands the consequences of asserting its power over a Member of
Congress or the Executive.
C. A Framework for a Coherent Precedent: The Myers Balancing Test
As discussed above, the Myers opinion should be used as precedent to
resolve the Circuit Split. Moving forward, appellate courts should utilize
the following framework when a Member of Congress moves for an
interlocutory appeal based on either the Speech or Debate Clause or the
separation of powers doctrine.
First, the Myers court determined that the Speech or Debate Clause was
properly before the court under Helstoski.86 Then, the court applied
similar reasoning from Helstoski to determine that the Member of
Congress was entitled to pre-trial review of his challenges to the
indictment grounded on the doctrine of separation of powers.87
The court then supported its conclusion by weighing certain policies
underlying the separation of powers doctrine against the policy of judicial
efficiency of avoiding piecemeal litigation.88 The main policy concerns
that shield a Member of Congress from standing trial are: (1) Members of
Congress serve as a vital check upon the executive and judicial branches
for the right of the people who elected the Senators and Congressmen; (2)
it is not too extravagant that a Member of Congress is entitled to pre-trial
review; (3) the interest in avoiding strain, expense, and injury to
reputation resulting from a trial on criminal charges even if the outcome
is favorable is especially compelling for Members of Congress; (4)
vindication on appeal will come after considerable political damage; (5)
85.
86.
87.
88.

See Jefferson, supra notes 17-18.
United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 935 (2d Cir, 1980).
Id.
Id. at 935-936.
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the Member’s capacity to represent his or her constituents is impaired;
and (6) it prevents intimidation by the executive and accountability before
a possibly hostile judiciary.89 These six weighty concerns easily tip the
balance in favor of allowing an exception to the general rule against
interlocutory appeals.
After accepting pre-trial review, the Myers court proceeded to analyze
the merits of both contentions made by the Member of Congress.90 After
addressing each point of contention, the court determined that the limits
of the Constitution and law had not been exceeded. Therefore, it affirmed
the district court’s order denying dismissal of the indictment.91
If a court follows the simple framework of: (1) establishing appellate
jurisdiction; and (2) addressing each point of contention to determine
whether the limits of the Constitution and the law have been exceeded, it
can properly balance policy concerns to ensure both a lack of judicial
encroachment and that no one is above the law. If the limits of the
Constitution and the law have been exceeded, the Member of Congress
will avoid litigation and face the consequences of his or her actions in his
or her own House. If the court determines the limits have not been
exceeded, as it did in the cases reviewed by this Article, the court simply
affirms the district court’s decision and the Member must endure the
burdens of litigation. This method respects the Constitution and ensures
trust in the independence of the Legislature.
V. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit unnecessarily created a circuit split in its decision
in Schock regarding the question of if Members of Congress can file
interlocutory appeal to a federal circuit court based on the separation of
powers doctrine. A clear understanding of the underlying history and
policy concerns of the separation of powers doctrine, in light of the
Speech or Debate Clause, should lead a court to determine that the
separation of powers doctrine is a proper basis for an interlocutory appeal
when made by a Member of Congress. Concerns of Members of Congress
being “above the law” lack merit because a circuit court can still affirm
the decision made by a district court allowing the case to proceed.
Allowing interlocutory appeals by Members of Congress merely permits
an indicted Member of Congress to utilize a narrowly tailored procedural
tool supported by valid policy concerns. To hold otherwise could
potentially burden elected representatives with litigation when they
should be focusing on legislation and representing their constituents.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 936.
91. Myers, 635 F.2d at 942.
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Finally, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve the circuit
split if it granted Aaron Schock’s petition for certiorari filed on October
1, 2018.92 However, it denied the petition on February 19, 2019.93 If the
Court did grant his petition, it should have relied on settled precedent from
the Second, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits to hold that a congressman
is able to file for pretrial review under both the separation of powers
doctrine and the Speech or Debate Clause.
The efficiency of Congress and the accountability of its Members is
important, which is why the Constitution gave Congress the power to
discipline its own Members rather than relying on the judiciary to do so.
The judiciary should get out of the House and let legislators legislate.

92. Petition filed Oct 01, 2018 (No. 18-406).
93. Petition denied Feb 19, 2019 (No. 18–406).
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